8 Things About the South China Sea Code of Conduct That Will Shift the 2026 Deadline
On July 10, 2024, Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo announced that roughly 80 percent of the draft South China Sea Code of Conduct had been completed. The announcement came during a press briefing in Manila and was accompanied by a copy of the draft text. This progress matters because the code is the only multilateral framework that could temper competing claims in a region where daily fishing, shipping and tourism depend on calm waters. If the draft stalls, the 2026 target set by ASEAN and China could slip, raising the risk of incidents at sea.
What’s Been Signed Off So Far
The draft code, first outlined at the 2011 ASEAN‑China Special Summit in Phnom Penh, has been negotiated in a series of technical working groups since 2022. According to an account to the Philippine Foreign Ministry, the latest round of talks in June 2024 produced a consensus on three core pillars: peaceful dispute settlement, environmental protection, and safety of navigation. A concrete detail in the text is the inclusion of a clause requiring all fishing vessels operating in the contested waters to register with a regional database by 2025.
The working groups met in Jakarta on May 28‑30, where China’s delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu, signaled willingness to accept a “non‑binding” framework, provided it does not prejudice Beijing’s historic claims. ASEAN’s chair, Indonesia, hosted the session and released a joint communiqué noting that 12 out of 14 agenda items were “substantially agreed”. The two remaining items – the enforcement mechanism and the dispute‑resolution timeline – are slated for a final round in the third quarter of 2025.
The progress is significant because it marks the first time that all ten ASEAN members have formally endorsed a shared language on maritime conduct, moving beyond the earlier, more fragmented statements that often excluded the Philippines or Vietnam.
Why the Code Matters to Everyday Life
First, the code directly affects the livelihoods of millions of fishers who ply the rich waters of the Spratly and Paracel chains. A 2023 study by the Asian Development Bank estimated that over 5 million people in the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia earn a living from small‑scale fishing in the South China Sea. If the code successfully establishes a transparent vessel‑registration system, it could reduce illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, which currently costs the regional fishing industry an estimated $3.5 billion annually, according to the FAO.
Second, the code has implications for global trade. Roughly 80 percent of the world’s maritime commerce – about $5 trillion worth of goods each year – passes through the South China Sea’s narrow straits. Shipping companies monitor the region for sudden rerouting caused by geopolitical tension. A stable code would lower insurance premiums and fuel costs for carriers, benefits that eventually filter down to consumer prices on everything from electronics to clothing.
Third, the code could shape the security environment for coastal communities. Recent incidents, such as the 2023 collision between a Vietnamese fishing boat and a Chinese coast guard cutter near the Scarborough Shoal, have heightened local fear. A clear, mutually‑agreed protocol for handling such encounters would give residents a sense of predictability, reducing the need for costly private security measures and allowing local economies to focus on tourism and trade rather than defense.
““The draft is a milestone, but it is only a draft,” said Dr. Surya Dharma, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, during a briefing in Singapore on July 12. “If the final text does not address enforcement, the whole exercise risks becoming a political footnote.””
What Remains Unclear
The biggest gap is the enforcement mechanism. While the draft mentions a “consultative panel” to review violations, it does not specify sanctions or the authority to compel compliance. China has historically resisted any clause that could be interpreted as limiting its naval activities, and ASEAN members have been reluctant to push for punitive measures that could alienate Beijing.
Another uncertainty concerns the dispute‑resolution timeline. The draft proposes a “five‑year review” but does not clarify
Despite the heavy military focus, about 70 percent of Chinese vessels operating in the South China Sea are civilian research ships, not warships, making scientific collaboration a surprisingly large component of the traffic.
